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R E G U L A R

A R T I C L E

Expert Testimony in Capital
Sentencing: Juror Responses
John H. Montgomery, DO, J. Richard Ciccone, MD, Stephen P. Garvey, JD, and
Theodore Eisenberg, JD
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia (1972), held that the death penalty is constitutional only when applied
on an individualized basis. The resultant changes in the laws in death penalty states fostered the involvement of
psychiatric and psychologic expert witnesses at the sentencing phase of the trial, to testify on two major issues:
(1) the mitigating factor of a defendant’s abnormal mental state and (2) the aggravating factor of a defendant’s
potential for future violence. This study was an exploration of the responses of capital jurors to psychiatric/
psychologic expert testimony during capital sentencing. The Capital Jury Project is a multi-state research effort
designed to improve the understanding of the dynamics of juror decision-making in capital cases. South Carolina
data (n ⫽ 214) were used to investigate the impact of expert testimony on the mitigating factor of mental illness
and the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Ordered logit regression analyses revealed significant correlations (p ⬍ .005) between the presence of a defense psychiatrist or psychologist expert witness during the
sentencing phase and jurors’ having the impression that the defendant was mentally disturbed. Similar analyses
revealed no significant relationship between the presence of state-introduced psychiatric testimony and jurors’
having the impression that the defendant, if not executed, would be violent in the future. These findings seem to
contradict the view that psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness in death penalty cases has a powerful
impact on jurors. The jurors in this study were significantly influenced, however, by psychiatric/psychologic
testimony in the area of a defendant’s mitigating mental abnormality.
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 33:509 –18, 2005

In the criminal justice arena, psychiatrists’ forensic
participation often involves evaluating a defendant’s
competency to stand trial or assessing the criminal
responsibility of defendants for their actions, when
affirmative defenses such as not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGRI) have been introduced. Although
the involvement of psychiatrists in other areas, such
as sentencing, was thought to be relatively uncommon before the 1970s, changes in the death penalty
statutes during that decade provided an incentive for
increased psychiatric participation in capital sentencing.1 Forensic psychiatrists are called on to provide
expert witness testimony in death penalty cases.
Dr. Montgomery is Assistant Clinical Professor, University of Mississippi Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior, Jackson, MS. Dr. Ciccone is Professor of Psychiatry and Director,
Psychiatry and Law Program, University of Rochester School of Medicine, Rochester, NY. Mr. Garvey is Professor of Law, and Mr. Eisenberg is the Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School,
Ithaca, NY. The materials used to prepare this manuscript were provided by the Psychiatry and Law Program of the University of Rochester, Rochester, NY. Address correspondence to: John H. Montgomery, DO, Mississippi State Hospital, PO Box 311, Whitfield, MS
39193. E-mail: jmontgo651@yahoo.com

In 1972, the United States Supreme Court ruled
in Furman v. Georgia2 that the Georgia death penalty
statute was unconstitutional because it created a substantial likelihood that the death penalty would be
imposed arbitrarily. In response, many states
adopted new statutes they hoped would be consistent
with Furman. To reduce the risk of arbitrariness,
states legislated a bifurcation of capital trials into
guilt and sentencing phases. The latter phase allowed
a jury or judge to consider the evidence offered in
mitigation or aggravation and to decide whether to
impose a death penalty according to statutory criteria.3
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
involving some of these post-Furman death penalty
statutes. In Gregg v. Georgia,4 the Court held that a jury
could use its discretion to give a life sentence to any
murderer no matter how aggravated the crime, emphasizing that discretionary mercy was not unconstitutional. The Court further clarified constitutional matters surrounding the death penalty by invalidating laws
in North Carolina and Louisiana that imposed a mandatory death sentence for certain crimes.5,6 From Fur-
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man and its progeny developed the Court’s position
that the death penalty is constitutional when it is applied on an individual basis, rather than categorically.7
By requiring the states to individualize the process,
the Supreme Court “virtually assured” the involvement
of psychiatrists and other mental health professionals.3
Two major substantive issues emerged when psychiatric
evaluation and testimony would become important in
the capital sentencing process. The first of these, an
expanded concept of mitigating mental abnormality or
diminished responsibility, typically is offered by psychiatric experts testifying on behalf of the defense to militate against a death sentence. The second is the question
of future dangerousness, or the likelihood that a defendant will pose a continuing threat to society, which is
typically offered by psychiatric experts testifying for the
prosecution.
The body of forensic psychiatric literature specifically dealing with psychiatric/psychologic expert
testimony in capital trials is relatively small, and we
are unaware of any empirical studies on the subject.
Similarly lacking in the professional literature are
studies on the effect of psychiatric testimony on
judges and juries in criminal proceedings.8
This article addresses psychiatric/psychologic expert witness testimony in the sentencing phase of
capital murder trials, regarding a defendant’s dangerousness as an aggravating factor and mental abnormality as a mitigating factor. We hypothesize that
psychiatric/psychologic expert testimony during the
sentencing phase has an effect on juror impressions
in both areas. Using data gathered by the Cornell
Death Penalty Project component of the Capital Jury
Project,9 we provide an analysis of the reported responses of capital jurors to psychiatric/psychologic
expert witness testimony.
Methods
The Capital Jury Project

The Capital Jury Project (CJP) is a National Science Foundation-funded, multi-state research effort
designed to improve understanding of the dynamics
of juror decision-making in capital cases.9 CJP researchers represent several disciplines (primarily law
and criminology) and institutions. In 1990, the Capital Jury Project began interviewing jurors in several
states who had served on capital cases, some of which
resulted in a sentence of death and some a sentence of
life imprisonment. The purpose was to conduct in-
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terviews with at least four jurors randomly selected
from a sample of cases, half of which resulted in a
final verdict of death and half of which resulted in a
final verdict of life imprisonment.
Each juror responded to a series of questions during interviews lasting between three and four hours.
The survey asked questions about the guilt phase of
the trial as well as the penalty phase; about the evidence presented; about the demeanor of the defendant, the actions of the victim’s family, and the performance of the lawyers and the judge; about the
legal instructions given; and about the process of the
jury’s deliberations, and the verdict reached. Demographic information (e.g., race, sex, age, religion) was
also collected, as was information about each juror’s
attitudes toward the death penalty and the criminal
justice system more generally. Each survey yielded
data on more than 750 variables.
The Capital Jury Project was reviewed and approved by the University Committee on Human
Subjects of Cornell University.
The South Carolina CJP

CJP data for the state of South Carolina, consisting
of interviews of more than 200 jurors in 65 capital cases,
comprise the largest share of the CJP’s total data.10 Previous studies based on nationwide CJP data suggest that
the South Carolina jurors behave much like jurors in
other states.11,12 The South Carolina CJP’s published
research thus far has yielded several important findings.
First, the shorter the time that a capital juror thinks the
defendant will be imprisoned, the more likely he or she
is to vote for death.12 Second, capital jurors underestimate how long capital murder defendants not sentenced to death usually stay in prison.12 One particular
study suggested that juror concerns about a defendant’s
parole eligibility (and subsequent potential for future
violence) have “predictable and deadly consequences.”14 Thirdly, future dangerousness plays a
prominent role in the jury’s discussions during the penalty phase, even when not introduced as an aggravating
factor by the prosecution, and often this overshadows
evidence presented in mitigation.14
The juror interview instrument, used by all CJP
states, contains nearly 200 questions, including questions about the case, trial, and respondent’s sentencing decision. The South Carolina instrument underwent revisions in 2000 and 2001 to include questions
about victim-impact evidence and future dangerous-
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ness. Several questions in South Carolina’s revised
instrument specifically addressed psychiatric expert
testimony on dangerousness, making the South
Carolina data a relevant focus for this study.
As with all other states, South Carolina capital
trials are bifurcated into a guilt stage and sentencing
stage.15 The same jury that determines the defendant’s guilt also determines his punishment. During
the sentencing trial, the jury may consider 11 statutory aggravating factors and 10 mitigating ones. The
jury cannot consider an aggravating circumstance
unless the state has proven its existence beyond a
reasonable doubt. No standard of proof is attached to
statutory mitigating factors. Once the jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance, it must then arrive at a sentence based on all the evidence. Although
South Carolina does not recognize future dangerousness as a statutory aggravating circumstance, the
prosecution is free to emphasize a defendant’s potential for future danger once it proves the existence of at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance.
To investigate the impact of psychiatric expert testimony on jurors in death penalty cases, we utilized
data already obtained from the South Carolina CJP,
comprising 214 juror interviews, from 65 capital
murder trials, 30 of which resulted in death sentences. Our investigations explored the impact of
psychiatric/psychologic expert witness testimony on
capital jurors’ impression of (1) the mitigating factor
of a defendant’s mental abnormality and (2) the aggravating factor of a defendant’s dangerousness or
propensity to commit future violent acts.
Statistical Analysis

In each area, the hypothesis that psychiatric expert
testimony during the sentencing trial has an impact
on juror impressions was tested by statistical analysis,
using Stata16 software. Three juror impressions are of
primary interest. The first juror impression deals
with dangerousness. Information about the jurors’
impressions of a defendant’s dangerousness is derived
from one interview question comprising Question
IIB1, which reads as follows:
In your mind, how well do the following words describe (DEFENDANT)
1 Not at all
2 Not well
3 Fairly well
4 Very well
Dangerous to other people

The variable for dangerousness, as well as the variables for “crazy” and “unstable,” were reordered to
reflect the ordering described in the text.
The second and third juror impressions deal with
the defendants’ mental abnormality. Information
about the jurors’ impressions of a defendant’s mental
abnormality is derived from two other questions
comprising part of Question IIB1. They read as
follows:
In your mind, how well do the following words describe (DEFENDANT)
1 Not at all
2 Not well
3 Fairly well
4 Very well
Emotionally unstable or disturbed
Went crazy when he committed the crime

We are primarily interested in the relation among
each of these three juror impressions and the presence of psychiatric expert testimony. Information
about the presence of expert psychiatric testimony
comes from two questions. Question IIIC3, which
relates to the presence of psychiatric testimony for
the prosecution, reads as follows:
Did the prosecution witnesses at the punishment stage of the trial
include
1 Yes
2 No
3 Not sure
A psychologist or psychiatrist?

Question IIIC6, which relates to the presence of psychiatric testimony for the defense, reads as follows:
Did the defense witnesses at the punishment stage of the trial
include
1 Yes
2 No
3 Not sure
A psychologist or psychiatric expert?

For each of the three juror impressions, we first
report univariate results describing the relation between the impressions and the presence of psychiatric
expert testimony. We then test the robustness of
these univariate results by using regression analyses in
which we account for other salient facts about the
case, the defendant, and the juror. Each regression
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analysis includes up to six independent controlling
variables in addition to the psychiatric testimony
variables of primary interest. These additional variables include criminal history, the crime’s seriousness, the defendant’s remorse, and the juror’s race.
These variables have been shown in previous CJP
studies to have relevant impact in capital juror decision-making during the punishment phase.10,12,17
We also include variables reflecting defendant race
and victim race. With respect to the seriousness of a
capital murder, one study showed two descriptors to
correlate significantly with seriousness of a crime:
“vicious” and “victim made to suffer.” Hence “vicious” is used in this study as a proxy for the seriousness of a defendant’s crime.
Ordered logit regression models are used because
the dependent variables in all of our regression models are ordinal and take on more than two values.18 As
described elsewhere,10 the sampling of South Carolina cases in more recent years is less comprehensive
than in early years. In addition, life sentences were
oversampled relative to death sentences. The regression models we construct account for these different
sampling rates. We also account for the fact that not
all juror responses are independent of one another;
that is, with few exceptions more than one interviewed juror sat on each case.19
Results
The ordered logit regression analyses demonstrated that the impact of psychiatric/psychologic
testimony on jurors’ views of the aggravating factor
of dangerousness and mitigating factor of mental abnormality in this study were:
1. Psychiatric expert testimony presented by the
prosecution during penalty phases did not significantly correlate with jurors’ impressions of a defendant’s future dangerousness in any of the models.
2. Psychiatric expert testimony presented by the
defense during the penalty phases significantly and
positively correlated with jurors’ impressions of a defendant’s mental abnormality in all models for both
variables (“crazy” and “unstable”).
Of 176 jurors responding to question IIIC3, 84
indicated that the prosecution introduced expert
psychological or psychiatric testimony during the
punishment phase of the trial. Of 156 juror responses
to question IIIC6, 86 jurors indicated that the defense introduced similar expert testimony. Of the
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Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Key Variables

Dangerousness
Any state psychiatric testimony
Any defense psychiatric testimony
Both state and defense psychiatric
testimony
Neither state nor defense
psychiatric testimony
Crazy
Any state psychiatric testimony
Any defense psychiatric testimony
Both state and defense psychiatric
testimony
Neither state nor defense
psychiatric testimony
Unstable
Any state psychiatric testimony
Any defense psychiatric testimony
Both state and defense psychiatric
testimony
Neither state nor defense
psychiatric testimony
Crime seriousness
Defendant remorse

Mean

Standard
Deviation

n

3.29
3.40
3.34

0.95
0.85
0.88

213
83
85

3.40

0.85

55

3.23
2.33
2.63
2.58

1.02
1.20
1.14
1.20

48
211
81
84

2.70

1.14

54

1.73
2.33
2.61
2.67

1.01
1.09
1.03
1.06

48
212
82
85

2.80

0.95

55

1.88
3.70
2.00

0.87
0.65
1.08

48
213
209

total number of juror responses, there were 22 cases
in which only a defense psychiatrist testified and 8
cases in which only a state psychiatrist testified. Of all
juror responses, neither a state psychiatrist nor a defense psychiatrist testified in 48 cases. In 56 cases,
both a state psychiatrist and a defense psychiatrist
testified.
In these cases, the expert witnesses (both prosecution and defense) represent a sizable body of psychiatrists and psychologists throughout the state (Blume
J, personal communication, February 2003) and
prosecutors in South Carolina do not seem to rely on
the testimony of just a few favored experts.
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations
for key dependent variables. For the variables of interest (“dangerous,” “crazy,” and “unstable”), measures of central tendency are additionally expressed
with respect to three subgroups: juror responses that
indicated the presence of any defense expert psychiatric testimony (opposed or unopposed), juror responses that indicated the presence of any state expert psychiatric testimony, juror responses that
indicated the presence of both defense and state expert psychiatric testimony, and juror responses that
indicated neither state nor defense testimony. The
key dependent variables (dangerous, crazy, and un-
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Table 2 Ordered Logit Models of Dangerousness (1 ⫽ least dangerous; 4 ⫽ most dangerous)
Model
(1)
Any state psychiatrist testimony (1 ⫽ present)

Model
(2)

0.120
(0.724)

Any defense psychiatrist testimony (1 ⫽ present)

0.208
(0.589)

Juror’s race (1 ⫽ black)
Victim’s race (1 ⫽ black)
Criminal history (1 ⫽ yes)

175
0.724

Model
(4)

0.245
(0.502)

Defendant’s race (1 ⫽ black)

Crime’s seriousness (1 ⫽ least serious; 4 ⫽ most
serious)
Remorse (1 ⫽ least remorseful; 4 ⫽ most
remorseful)
Observations (n)
Prob ⬎ F

Model
(3)

155
0.589

0.509
(0.307)
⫺0.765
(0.097)
1.305
(0.011)*
1.344
(0.001)†
0.965
(0.000)†
⫺0.472
(0.024)*
155
0.000

Model
(5)

Model
(6)

Model
(7)

Model
(8)

0.676
(0.096)
⫺0.715
(0.024)*
0.446
(0.616)

0.336
(0.404)
0.673
(0.109)
⫺0.980
(0.022)*
0.138
(0.807)

⫺0.011
(0.981)
0.478
(0.368)
0.855
(0.067)
⫺0.993
(0.031)*
0.443
(0.537)

174
0.132

155
0.051

133
0.119

⫺0.160
(0.710)
1.296
(0.300)
0.775
(0.179)
⫺0.803
(0.140)
1.224
(0.044)*
1.296
(0.007)†
0.927
(0.000)†
⫺0.476
(0.067)
123
0.000

0.222
(0.506)
0.336
(0.441)
0.673
(0.199)
⫺0.715
(0.153)
0.446
(0.551)
0.994
(0.022)*
0.810
(0.000)†
⫺0.364
(0.095)
142
0.000

Probabilities are in parentheses.
* Significant at p ⬍ 0.05;
† Significant at p ⬍ 0.01.

stable) were ordinal measures, with a higher value
representing stronger juror impression that this variable described the defendant. Independent variables
for the crime’s seriousness and defendant’s remorse
were also ordinal measures, with maximum values
indicating “most remorseful” or “most serious.”
Mean values for each variable, along with standard
deviations are shown in the first and second columns.
The defendant’s perceived dangerousness, craziness, and instability on average were less when neither state nor defense psychiatric testimony was presented. This result is not necessarily surprising. Cases
in which neither the state nor the defense introduced
psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant’s future dangerousness are likely to have been cases in
which the state chose not to emphasize the defendant’s future dangerousness, and thus the defense
had no need to reply in kind by emphasizing the
defendant’s nondangerousness. Conversely, cases in
which neither the state nor the defense introduced
psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant’s craziness or instability are likely to have been cases in
which the defense chose not to emphasize the defendant’s craziness or instability, and thus the state had
no need to reply in kind by emphasizing the defendant’s sanity or stability. Consequently, cases in
which neither the state nor the defense introduced
evidence of the defendant’s future dangerousness,
craziness, or instability are likely to have been cases in

which the defendant was in the judgment of the side
most likely to have raised the issue not especially
dangerous, crazy, or unstable.
Table 2 reports the regression analyses of dangerousness as a function of the presence of expert psychiatric testimony and combinations of the independent controlling variables just described. A positive
sign on the coefficient indicates that an increase in
the value of the independent variable is associated
with an increase in the value of the dependent variable, and a negative sign on the coefficient indicates
that an increase in the value of the independent variable is associated with a decrease in the value of the
dependent variable. (For a discussion of the interpretation of coefficients in ordered logit models, see Ref.
20, pp 127– 40.) Tests for the significance of each
model as a whole (Prob ⬎ F) are presented on the
bottom row of Tables 2, 3, and 4.
Each model (1– 8) in Table 2 models the dependent variable dangerousness as a function of one or
more independent variables. Model 1 is a singlevariable model of dangerousness as a function of state
psychiatric testimony. One cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no significant association between
the two variables. Subsequent models include state
psychiatric testimony combined with different controlling variables. Again, no significant relationship
between state psychiatric testimony and dangerousness is seen in any model.
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Table 3 Ordered Logit Models of Crazy (1 ⫽ least crazy; 4 ⫽ most crazy)
Model
(1)
Any state psychiatrist testimony (1 ⫽ present)

Model
(2)

0.694
(0.034)*

Any defense psychiatrist testimony (1 ⫽ present)

1.260
(0.000)†

Juror’s race (1 ⫽ black)
Victim’s race (1 ⫽ black)
Criminal history (1 ⫽ yes)

173
0.034

Model
(4)

0.698
(0.041)*

Defendant’s race (1 ⫽ black)

Crime’s seriousness (1 ⫽ least serious; 4 ⫽ most
serious)
Remorse (1 ⫽ least remorseful; 4 ⫽ most
remorseful)
Observations (n)
Prob ⬎ F

Model
(3)

154
0.000

Model
(5)

Model
(6)

Model
(7)

Model
(8)

⫺0.413
(0.251)
0.184
(0.622)
⫺0.272
(0.655)

1.209
(0.000)†
⫺0.519
(0.139)
0.463
(0.241)
0.166
(0.793)

⫺0.070
(0.871)
1.579
(0.001)†
⫺0.718
(0.086)
0.361
(0.422)
0.487
(0.437)

172
0.204

154
0.006

132
0.007

0.223
(0.614)
1.365
(0.008)†
⫺0.713
(0.072)
0.095
(0.847)
0.768
(0.344)
⫺0.599
(0.201)
0.246
(0.500)
0.716
(0.001)†
123
0.000

0.639
(0.053)

1.156
(0.001)†
⫺0.462
⫺0.520
(0.213)
(0.172)
⫺0.044
0.143
(0.911)
(0.761)
⫺0.030
0.440
(0.961)
(0.546)
⫺0.613
⫺0.266
(0.079)
(0.552)
0.411
0.245
(0.091)
(0.393)
0.605
0.635
(0.000)† (0.001)†
155
142
0.008
0.001

Probabilities are in parentheses.
* Significant at p ⬍ 0.05;
† Significant at p ⬍ 0.01.

The independent variables that significantly affected jurors’ impression of a defendant’s dangerousness (in all models) were a defendant’s criminal history and the seriousness of the crime. The victim’s
race became significant in models 3 and 8, with the
presence of a white victim correlating significantly
with dangerousness. The juror’s race became significant in models 5, 6, and 7, in which white jurors

tended to correlate significantly with dangerousness.
Defendants who showed little or no remorse correlated significantly with dangerousness in model 1
and reached near significance in model 8. The defendant’s race approached significance in two of the
models, with jurors rating black defendants as more
dangerous. However in regression models where
case-characteristic variables (i.e., crime seriousness

Table 4 Ordered Logit Models of Unstable (1 ⫽ least unstable; 4 ⫽ most unstable)
Model
(1)
Any state psychiatrist testimony (1 ⫽ present)

Model
(2)

0.764
(0.031)*

Any defense psychiatrist testimony (1 ⫽
present
Defendant’s race (1 ⫽ black)

1.223
(0.000)†

Victim’s race (1 ⫽ black)
Criminal history (1 ⫽ yes)

174
0.031

Model
(4)

0.811
(0.019)*

Juror’s race (1 ⫽ black)

Crime’s seriousness (1 ⫽ least serious; 4 ⫽
most serious)
Remorse (1 ⫽ least remorseful; 4 ⫽ most
remorseful)
Observations (n)
Prob ⬎ F

Model
(3)

155
0.000

⫺0.739
(0.057)
0.275
(0.620)
⫺0.532
(0.446)
0.353
(0.240)
0.272
(0.292)
0.115
(0.454)
155
0.014

Model
(5)

Model
(6)

Model
(7)

Model
(8)

⫺0.639
(0.089)
0.367
(0.415)
⫺0.651
(0.300)

1.091
(0.000)†
⫺0.663
(0.119)
0.809
(0.114)
⫺0.469
(0.463)

0.136
(0.821)
1.438
(0.011)*
⫺0.876
(0.056)
0.740
(0.175)
0.242
(0.677)

173
0.032

155
0.001

133
0.000

0.341
(0.562)
1.517
(0.013)*
⫺1.024
(0.034)*
0.938
(0.159)
0.425
(0.563)
0.411
(0.294)
0.021
(0.940)
⫺0.048
(0.797)
123
0.001

0.642
(0.065)
1.256
(0.001)†
⫺0.847
(0.075)
0.995
(0.126)
⫺0.383
(0.650)
0.304
(0.419)
0.103
(0.701)
⫺0.110
(0.560)
142
0.010

Probabilities are in parentheses.
* Significant at p ⬍ 0.05;
† Significant at p ⬍ 0.01.
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and remorse) were included as controlling variables,
the correlation between black defendant and dangerousness became less significant. In models not reported in this article, we included variables representing the various racial combinations of defendants
and victims (black defendant-black victim, black defendant-white victim, white defendant-white victim,
and white defendant-black victim). No material
changes emerged with respect to our principal results
involving the influence of psychiatric testimony on
jurors’ beliefs about the defendant’s future dangerousness, craziness, and instability.
Table 3 reports the regression analyses of “craziness” as a function of the presence of expert psychiatric testimony and combinations of the independent controlling variables. Similar to Table 2, each
model (1– 8) in the table represents a statistical correlation between one or more independent variables
with the dependent variable for “. . .defendant went
crazy when he committed the crime.” Defense psychiatric testimony was significant in each model.
State psychiatric testimony was significant in Models
2 and 4 but lost significance in models in which
defense psychiatric testimony was included as a controlling variable. Remorse showed significance
whenever it was included in the regression analysis in
Table 3.
Table 4 reports the regression analyses of
“. . .mentally unstable or disturbed” as a function of
the presence of expert psychiatric testimony and
combinations of the independent variables. Defense
psychiatric testimony was significant in each model.
As in Table 4, state psychiatric testimony was significant only in the models where the defense psychiatric testimony was not included as a controlling variable. The defendant’s race approached significance
in Model 7 and became significant in Model 8, suggesting that white defendants were more likely to be
seen by the jurors as “. . .mentally unstable or disturbed.” The defendant’s remorse was not significant
in any model for “unstable.”
The juror instrument did not include questions
dealing specifically with psychiatric testimony of future dangerousness until May 19, 2000, and unfortunately, the question did not distinguish between
defense or prosecution expert. (The question added
to the CJP instrument asked, “Did a psychiatrist,
psychologist, or other mental health professional testify for the state or the defense about [the defen-

Table 5

Question* Regarding Future Dangerousness

Not important
Somewhat important
Very important
Most important

% Reponding

n

44
40
12
1

11
10
3
1

* How important was the psychiatric testimony regarding future
dangerousness to your assessment of the defendant’s potential future
dangerousness?

dant’s] potential for future dangerousness?” Question Xa22.) Since this revision, 54 jurors have
completed the instrument, 25 of whom reported that
expert testimony on dangerousness was presented. A
subsequent question in the revised instrument asked
about the importance of such testimony, if offered in
the punishment phase. These results are summarized
in Table 5.
The results presented in Table 5 are consistent
with the regression analysis in Table 2. Table 5 shows
that, among the limited number of jurors who were
asked directly how important the psychiatric testimony, if any, was to their assessment of future dangerousness, over 80 percent indicated that the testimony was either “not important” or only “somewhat
important.” Only 3 jurors (of the 25 responding)
said such evidence was “very important” to their assessment of future dangerousness, and only one said
it was “most important.” Overall, Table 5 suggests
that when psychiatric testimony specifically addressing dangerousness was presented during the sentencing trial, jurors found this only marginally important.
Discussion
In his dissenting opinion in Barefoot v. Estelle,21
Justice Blackmun described the legal prediction of
future dangerousness by psychiatrists as shrouding
unreliable scientific evidence in an “. . .aura of scientific infallibility.” His primary concern with such testimony was that it had a prejudicial impact on jurors,
who were at risk of accepting it, “. . .without critical
scrutiny.”
Although others have subsequently warned that
capital jurors give psychiatric testimony on future
dangerousness more weight than it deserves,3 or accept it uncritically,22 there have been no empirical
studies to date in which the weight of such testimony
was measured. A CJP paper looking at California
capital jurors found that among the different types of
witnesses who testify at a capital trial (professional
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experts, lay experts, and family members), the jury is
likely to be most skeptical of professional expert witnesses.23 However, this study used anecdotal and
qualitative methodology rather than statistical analysis.
On the aggravating factor of future dangerousness, our results suggest that psychiatric expert testimony does not have significant impact on the jurors’
impressions of a defendant’s likelihood to engage in
future violence. The regression models reported in
Table 2 are consistent with an absence of evidence of
a significant relation. The presence of a state-appointed psychiatric expert did not correlate significantly with the dependent variable of dangerousness
in any of the models in Table 2.
One caveat to consider is that the variable “state
psychiatric testimony” contains only the presence or
absence of the state’s expert witness testimony by a
psychiatrist or psychologist during the punishment
phase and did not address the content of that testimony. Often, the state utilizes psychiatric experts
during this phase to support the aggravating factor of
dangerousness,24 although the possibility exists that
such an expert could focus on other areas. A psychiatrist could be called by the prosecution to respond to
a defense expert’s claim of mitigating mental abnormality. The prosecution could also conceivably call a
psychiatrist to present victim impact testimony.25
When focusing on the mitigating factor of a defendant’s mental abnormality, psychiatric testimony
becomes more influential. Tables 3 and 4 explore the
influence of psychiatric testimony on jurors’ perceptions of mental abnormality, while controlling for
other aspects of the cases. The regression models in
Table 3 show a strong, statistically significant relation between the presence of defense psychiatric testimony and jurors’ increased likelihood of perceiving
the defendant as “crazy” at the time of the offense.
Models 7 and 8 show that the presence of a defense
expert witness during the sentencing phase, while
accounting for several other independent variables,
including the testimony of a prosecution psychiatric
expert during the sentencing phase, has a significant
association with the jurors’ impression that the defendant “. . .went crazy when he committed the
crime.” We explored whether the difference between
the impact of defense psychiatric testimony and prosecution psychiatric testimony, as suggested by Table
3, is a consequence of jurors’ hearing defense psychiatric testimony and not prosecution psychiatric tes-
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timony. When such responses were omitted, however, the strong defense-psychiatric testimony effect
in the models in Table 3 remains substantial and
statistically significant. Table 4 similarly suggests the
significance of defense expert testimony on juror’s
impressions of the defendant as emotionally unstable
or disturbed.
In both these analyses (Tables 3, 4), the independent variable “defense psychiatric testimony”
reached statistical significance in all models. Of interest, the presence of state psychiatric testimony also
correlated positively with both dependent variables
of mental abnormality in Models 1 and 3. In Models
7 and 8, however, in which “defense psychiatric testimony” was also included as an explanatory variable,
“state psychiatric testimony” lost statistical significance. These results stem from the fact that jurors
often heard both defense and state psychiatric testimony during a sentencing hearing. When both sides
introduced psychiatric testimony, the state effect disappears. State psychiatric testimony loses significance. Thus, the models/results lend greater support
to a robust defense psychiatric effect than a state psychiatric effect. One possible concern is that the significant results displayed in the models could be attributable to the selection of cases in which the
defense of the state elected to present psychiatric testimony rather than to the impact of such testimony
in cases in which it was presented. Selection models
that first account for the decision to offer testimony,
and then model the impact of such testimony, could
be a fruitful technique for addressing the concern
(Ref. 16, p 31).
The perception of a defendant as showing remorse
correlated positively to a significant degree with the
dependent variable “crazy” in all models. “Remorse”
did not reach significance in the analysis of the dependent variable “unstable.” The notion of remorse
has complex moral implications, and a juror who
believed that the defendant showed remorse for his
crime might be more inclined to accept that he
“. . .went crazy when he committed the murder.” A
reason for the lack of a similar correlation between
remorseful and unstable perhaps lies within the
meanings of the variables. “Crazy” addressed only
the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense; whereas unstable implied the defendant’s
present mental state (during the trial). If the juror
believed the defendant appeared remorseful, this ap-
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pearance might be inconsistent with the juror’s notions of how an “unstable or disturbed” person
would behave in court.
Conclusion
The results of this study showed that psychiatric/
psychologic expert witness testimony did not have a
measurable impact on capital jurors’ impression of a
defendant’s future dangerousness. The jurors’ views
are consistent with arguments made by the American
Psychiatric Association and other organizations that
psychiatrists/psychologists have limited ability to
make predictions of long-term dangerousness.26
These findings also seem to contradict the view that
psychiatric testimony on the aggravating factor of
dangerousness has a powerful effect on jurors at the
sentencing phase.3,21,22
On the other hand, psychiatric/psychologic expert
witness testimony significantly influenced the jurors’
views of the usually mitigating factor of a defendant’s
mental abnormality. This is consistent with the view
that psychiatrists and psychologists, through years of
training and experience, are experts in the clinical
detection of mental disorders.
Although we assert that such testimony had a favorable impact on the juror’s impression that the
defendant was mentally unstable, we did not measure
whether this impression actually had a mitigating
effect on the jurors’ decision-making. It is possible
that some jurors actually treat a defendant’s mental
abnormality as an aggravating factor rather than a
mitigating one, as suggested by some.27,28
A potential limitation of this study is concern
about the power of the statistical analyses, or roughly
how large a study’s population (n) would have to be
for a statistically significant result to be obtained.
Such a power calculation would require specifying
how large an effect that psychiatric testimony would
have to have on a juror’s impression of a defendant’s
dangerousness or mitigating mental abnormality to
be socially important. The absence of statistically significant associations between psychiatric testimony
and assessments of defendant dangerousness could
be a consequence of sample size. Perfectly executed
studies may fail to reveal socially important differences “simply because the sample sizes are too small
to give the procedure enough power to detect the
effect.”29 But we note that the sample proved large

enough to detect statistically significant defense expert testimony effects with respect to the two mental
abnormality impressions.
Another potential limitation lies in the fact that
the CJP instrument was not intended to be a psychological measure. Terminology such as “dangerous,”
“crazy,” “remorse,” and “unstable” represent complex concepts, and relying on only a few questions
from the juror instrument to define a juror’s global
impression about a defendant’s mental state might be
oversimplifying a rather complicated process. Revision of the various states’ CJP study questionnaires to
address these concepts more specifically and to take
into account the role of psychiatric/psychologic expert witnesses in juror decision-making may also be
helpful in further analysis of the expert witness’s role
in these proceedings.
Finally, replication of this study using CJP data
from other states may further elucidate or expand on
the findings of the index study.
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